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Legal histories of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era tend to focus inordinately
on economic regulation within a doctrinal framework in which private rights, equal
protection, and “substantive” due process guided judicial decision-making. Consequently,
the overarching economic context in prevailing legal historiography obscures an
important yet oft-overlooked development in the linkage between public rights, natural
resource trusteeship, and the early-twentieth-century environmental conservation
movement. This development is inextricably tied to the evolution of water law in the late
nineteenth century and the expansion of the American commercial republic. A normative
understanding of public water rights during this period is confined to an economic
framework in which water functioned either as a highway for commerce or as a source of
power.
This article argues that the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter, in a departure from economic instrumentalism, inaugurated a novel
reconceptualization of water as a natural resource in and of itself. The legal principles on
which Hudson County rested—the sanctity of the broad interests and welfare of the
people with regard to public waters—had been firmly established by 1908. However, the
public interest and public rights in water were inherently economic; no doctrinal or legal
interpretations of water prior to Hudson County recognized public waters in broad and
iv

unconditional language that transcended economic pretexts. Furthermore, Hudson County
signifies the confluence of three distinct historical currents: the development of a robust
judicial public trust doctrine, the emergence of environmental conservation as a social
and political imperative, and the beginning of a progressive shift in American
constitutional jurisprudence. Each of these three strands was essential to the legal
transcendence of water as a natural resource during the Progressive Era.
This reinterpretation of Hudson County places it within existing interpretive
models of legal history as more of a paradigmatic signpost than any sort of abrupt
intervention. Hudson County thus stands as a progressive antecedent to the later era of
legal realism and the much later formulation of modern environmental law.

v

Introduction
Teddy Roosevelt recounted in his 1913 autobiography that, prior to his
administration, America’s “public resources were being handled and disposed of in
accordance with the small considerations of petty legal formalities, instead of for the
large purposes of constructive development.” Echoing the great refrains of the
Progressive Era, Roosevelt attributed the situation to widespread tendencies in
governments at all levels to bend to the private interests of American corporations. He
further maintained that America’s “magnificent river system, with its superb possibilities
for public usefulness,” had been mismanaged and unduly influenced by special interests. 1
Roosevelt’s critical comments on corporate interests and laissez-faire governance
through the turn of the century are representative of contemporary popular perceptions.
Roosevelt, the champion of progressive reform, would almost certainly have been aware
of these perceptions and perhaps drew upon them in an effort to inflate the heroic
accomplishments of his previous administration on the heels of a presidential election
defeat and Republican Party crisis in 1912. Moreover, Roosevelt—whose sole Supreme
Court nominee, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, remained on the Supreme Court bench
until 1932—must have been keenly aware of critical perceptions of the much-maligned
Supreme Court. Popular criticism of the court in these years of the Progressive Era
generally contended that “judicial power was being used to thwart the will of the people
and to advance the interests of the propertied classes.” 2

1

395.

Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925),

Owen Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, vol. 8 of The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States, ed. Stanley N. Katz (New
York: Macmillan, 1993), 4.
2
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Legal historians have come to refer to this period as the Lochner era for its
eponymous 1905 working hours case Lochner v. New York, in which Justice Holmes
issued a curt dissenting opinion that famously denounced his fellow justices for
embracing laissez-faire “economic theory.” 3 Owen Fiss has remarked that Holmes’s
dissent “provided the progressives with a critique of the Court from within,” and later
critiques from contemporary scholars such as Roscoe Pound and Charles Beard forged a
strained conception of the federal judiciary during the Progressive Era. 4 Historians have
since invoked Lochner generally to call upon the overarching jurisprudential trend toward
“substantive” readings of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
particularly in an economic context. 5 Howard Gillman accurately characterized this
phenomenon as a “persistent neo-Holmesian conceptualization of the Lochner era.” 6
The conventional account of the Lochner era generally characterizes Supreme
Court jurisprudence from 1877 to 1934 as the judicial manifestation of conservative
economic activism—what Barry Cushman describes as the “complimentary factors of a
commitment to laissez-faire economics, a devotion to the tenets of social Darwinism, and

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, 6. On contemporary progressive critiques, see Melvin I.
Urofsky, “Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive
Era,” Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook (1983): 53–72. See also Brad Snyder, “The
House That Built Holmes,” Law and History Review 30, no. 3 (August 2012): 661–721.
5
“Substantive” due process generally indicates a broad or expansive reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in which “‘due process’ . . . could refer to
‘substantive’ as well as ‘procedural’ guarantees. . . . [Critical commentators] came to use the
phrase ‘substantive due process’ as a pejorative term, designating cases in which courts had
inappropriately injected ‘individualism’ and ‘laissez-faire’ views into their readings of ‘liberty’ in
due process cases.” G. Edward White, “Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s
Lochner Dissent,” Brooklyn Law Review 63, no. 1 (1997): 109–110. White notes that “Holmes
and the great bulk of his juristic contemporaries . . . never used the term ‘substantive due process’
at all.” White, “Revisiting Substantive Due Process,” 87n2.
6
Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era
Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 6.
3
4
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to a desire to shield businesses from legislation aimed at protecting workers and
consumers.” 7 As we have seen, the laissez-faire activist account began with one of
America’s most illustrious jurists, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who famously chastised
the judicial overreaching of his fellow Supreme Court justices as early as 1905. 8
However, Lochner era revisionists have shed new light on this important period and
thoroughly debunked the conceptions of laissez-faire judicial activism and industrialist
tycoon protectionism. 9 Instead, justices on the high court during this era operated as
guardians of the “virtues of equality and generality” through the strict application of the
constitutional principle of “neutrality.” 10 Strict, or “formal,” interpretation of the
Constitution—especially the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses—marked this new account of Lochner era jurisprudence known as legal
formalism. 11
Although these new interpretive models provide a balanced and meaningful

Barry Cushman, “Teaching the Lochner Era,” Saint Louis University Law Journal 62,
no. 3 (2018): 540. Lochner era historiography conventionally begins with the 1877 case Munn v.
Illinois and ends either with Nebbia v. New York (1934) or West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
(1937). Nebbia marks Cushman’s revision of the Lochner era and the traditional account of the
“constitutional revolution” of 1937; see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The
Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
8
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also White, “Revisiting
Substantive Due Process.”
9
Authoritative Lochner era revisions are Gillman, The Constitution Besieged; and
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court; and Michael Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” Law
and History Review 3, no. 2 (1985): 293–332. See also William J. Novak, “Law and the Social
Control of American Capitalism,” Emory Law Journal 60, no. 2 (2010): 377–406; and James W.
Ely Jr., The Fuller Court: Justices, Rulings, Legacy (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003).
10
Cushman, “Teaching the Lochner Era,” 541–544; Gillman, The Constitution Besieged,
20.
11
The historiographic phrase “Lochner era” is generally synonymous with the more
descriptive phrases “era of substantive due process” and “legal formalism.” See Richard A.
Posner, “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 37, no. 2 (1986–87): 179–217; and Thomas C.
Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 45, no. 1 (Fall 1983): 1–54.
7
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account of the development of constitutional law in America, they do so manifestly
within the economic context of a capitalist enterprise. The preponderance of Lochner era
legal historiography presents law, society, and politics in inordinately economic terms
and obscures the persistence of a long-standing and important aspect of American legal
history: an unwavering jurisprudential commitment to the common-law maxim salus
populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). 12 The seemingly
inescapable legacy of the Lochner era—or, as some historians have referred to it, the
“ghost” of Lochner 13— is its status as the symbol of unrestrained judicial activism and
the sanctity of economic liberty at the expense of public progress. This is both
unfortunate and ironic given that the underlying doctrine in Munn v. Illinois—the
“foundational case for the ‘affected with a public interest doctrine’” that marks the
beginning of the Lochner era—rested on the legal and philosophical tenets necessary for
good governance in pursuit of the people’s welfare. 14
Despite this misleading legacy and the generally conservative trend favoring a
large and robust private sphere, the public sphere and public rights did not disappear. In
fact, in contravention to the broad sweep of Lochner era generalities, public rights
flourished throughout the Progressive Era. One particular strand of public rights law
bears this out: public rights in water. The nineteenth-century common law regulatory
framework—set upon the hallowed republican ground of salus populi—paved the way
for the development of a doctrinal set of principles that preserved state water resources
for the public’s benefit. These public trust principles established what would later
Translation in William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in
Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 9.
13
Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, 395.
14
Cushman, “Teaching the Lochner Era,” 537n1; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
12
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become known as the public trust doctrine. 15
By 1908 public rights and public trust principles had developed fully enough that
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
delivered an uncompromising declaration of public rights regarding a state’s (New
Jersey, in this case) water resources:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private
property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. . . . The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights
of lower owners, but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially
diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health. 16
Joseph Sax, a pioneer of environmental law in the 1970s and preeminent authority on the
public trust doctrine, described Holmes’s opinion as perhaps “the most important
statement the Court has ever made about the constitutional status of water rights.” 17 Still,
Hudson County is rarely cited outside of specialized studies and its influence in
subsequent water rights cases is hardly remarkable. 18 Given its supposed importance to

For authoritative accounts on the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, “The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,” Michigan Law Review
68, no. 3 (January 1970): 471–566; Joseph L. Sax, “The Limits of Private Rights in Public
Waters,” Environmental Law 19, no. 3, (Spring 1989): 473–483; Molly Selvin, “The Public Trust
Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789–1920,” Wisconsin Law Review 1980, no.
6 (1980): 1403–1442; and Charles F. Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine,” Environmental Law 19, no. 3
(Spring 1989): 425–472.
16
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
17
Sax, “The Limits of Private Rights,” 480.
18
See, for instance, Joseph Regalia and Noah D. Hall, “Waters of the State,” Natural
Resources Journal 59, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 59–89; and Catherine B. Stetson, “Do State Water
Anti-Exportation Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause? or Will New Mexico’s Embargo Law
Hold Water,” Natural Resources Journal 21 no. 3 (Summer 1981): 617–630.
15
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the “constitutional status of water rights,” as well as its central role in the litigative
strategy of modern environmental activists, why is Hudson County so absent in the pages
of legal history? 19 If Hudson County has no place in conventional accounts of
Progressive Era America, what is its significance, if any? Moreover, if “few public
interests are more obvious” than the rights of the public to state waters, as Justice Holmes
asserted, how might these rights be construed outside of traditional economic contexts
(as, for instance, in modern environmental law)?
An assessment of Hudson County in this regard is necessary precisely because
Justice Holmes eschewed any economic “clothing,” leaving instead the implication that
water—transcending mere economic instrumentality—must be considered an essential
natural resource. Holmes declared that a state need not specify how, why, or to what end
it might seek to preserve its natural resources. 20 This new interpretation of public water
rights had no precedent—prior to Hudson County, public trust jurisprudence rested
predominately on economic ground. Yet historians have largely ignored its existence
because it had no place within the economic context that pervades Lochner era
historiography. Moreover, Hudson County runs afoul of traditional instrumentalist
accounts of the nineteenth-century legal order, in which law functioned as a tool for the
“release of [economic] energy.” 21 In other words, it is unnecessary to invoke Hudson
County where a substantial body of prominent water rights cases more-than-adequately
supports the assertion that public rights in water were entrenched within an understanding

On litigative strategy for modern environmental activists, see Sax, “The Public Trust
Doctrine,” and Elise L. Larson, “In Deep Water: A Common Law Solution to the Bulk Water
Export Problem,” Michigan Law Review 96, no. 2 (December 2011): 739–767.
20
Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357.
21
James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century
United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 3.
19
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of its economic function as either a highway for commerce or a source of production (as
in a mill dam, for instance). The historical linkages between nineteenth-century American
economic development and public water rights have been well established; Hudson
County simply has no place in conventional accounts. 22
In this article I argue that Hudson County is significant because, for the first time
in US Supreme Court jurisprudence, it implicitly recasts the legal conceptualization of
water from a predominately economic instrument to a natural resource in and of itself. To
be clear, the term natural resource is itself ambiguous and somewhat anachronistic in a
legal sense; I use the term here to connote a modernistic definition that considers natural
resources as common, naturally occurring elements “existing in a state of ecological
balance.” 23 Prevailing accounts of this period in American legal history, entrenched in
economic perspectives, obscure this realization. In revisiting this hitherto overlooked and
underappreciated public water rights case, I show how Justice Holmes, the ideological
forebear of legal realism, may have been inclined to move with the currents of social
action within a milieu of progressive social, political, and philosophical ideology that
undergirded the Progressive Era environmental conservation movement. 24 By the time
Excellent accounts in this regard include Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West:
Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848–1902 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1992); Michael C. Blumm and Aurora Paulsen Moses, “The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly
Doctrine,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 44, no. 1 (2017): 1–54; and Harry
N. Scheiber, “The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the
State Courts,” in Perspectives in American History, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn
(Cambridge, MA: Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, 1971), 5:329–402.
23
I borrow this exceptional phrase from a modern case which thoroughly examined the
legal definitional elements of the term natural resource: Paige v. Town Plan Zoning Commission,
35 Conn. App. 646, 671 (1994) (Schaller, J., dissenting). In regards to Hudson County, the term
did not officially exist in contemporary legal lexicon; the first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
(1891) does not define either natural resource or public resource.
24
For my purposes here, I use the term legal realism to describe the modernist judicial
philosophy in which jurisprudents look beyond the confines of orthodox rules, traditions, and
deductive reasoning (that is, legal formalism), relying as well on sociological investigation,
22
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Holmes drafted his 1908 Hudson County opinion, there was already a substantial
intellectual framework throughout contemporary American society supporting
environmental conservation. 25 And Holmes, the prototypical jurisprudential realist,
possessed the uncanny intellectual ability to synthesize and refine such ideas into
conspicuously transcendent judicial declarations. 26
But, in crafting the majority opinion in Hudson County, Holmes first had to create
the legal and intellectual space in which to do so. He did this by abrogating any precept
on which economic substantive due process might prevail among his formalistic
colleagues; the resultant status of water as a natural resource lacked the economic
presupposition to which it was previously tied. Holmes then asserted, in plainly crafted
philosophic language, that state waters were “natural advantages” and “a great public
good” that ought to be protected and maintained “substantially undiminished.” 27
Furthermore, analysis of public water rights cases in the Progressive Era
reaffirms the Lochner era jurisprudential commitment to American constitutional ideals,

ethical principles, and so-called “extra-legal” methods of inquiry. David E. Ingersoll, “Karl
Llewellyn, American Legal Realism, and Contemporary Legal Behaviorism,” Ethics 76, no. 4
(July 1966): 264. See also Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Routledge,
2017). Frank’s exposition of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s judicial tendencies as a “completely adult
jurist” is, perhaps, the definitive historical embodiment of legal realism:
[Holmes’s] judicial opinions and other writings . . . are a treasury of adult
counsels, of balanced judgments as to the relation of the law to other social
relations. There you will find a vast knowledge of legal history divorced from
slavish veneration for the past, a keen sensitiveness to the needs of today with no
irrational revolt against the conceptions of yesterday, a profound respect for the
utility of syllogistic reasoning linked with an insistence upon recurrent revisions
of premises based on patient studies of new facts and new desires. (p. 270)
25
See Paul Russell Cutright, Theodore Roosevelt: The Making of a Conservationist
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985); and Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The
American Environmental Movement, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003).
26
Richard A. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes: Selections from Letters, Speeches,
Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992) xx–xxiii.
27
Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 356, 357.
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Jacksonian republicanism, and the common-law salus populi maxim. And, as Harry
Scheiber reminds us, this commitment has been “entirely consistent with the formulation
of positive notions of public rights.” 28 My analysis of Hudson County and the public trust
doctrine, then, is entirely consistent with Lochner era revisionists’ characterization of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which hinged on “distinctions between legitimate
promotions of the public interest and illegitimate efforts to impose special burdens and
benefits.” 29 With regard to water rights and public trust principles in the late nineteenth
century, legitimate promotions of the public interest—tied directly to the promotion of
the American commercial republic—led to the development of a robust public trust
doctrine. In both a continuation of and a departure from these public trust principles,
Hudson County shows how a commitment to public rights need not rely on economic
precepts; the “publicness” of the water itself was good enough. In other words, water
resources of the state may be preserved in trust for the public without being conditioned
on or tied to an economic premise.
My aim is not to rewrite the history of the Lochner era, but to reveal the social
and philosophical currents upon which postbellum America moved into the Progressive
Era and how these currents informed modern American law and society. To borrow an
exceptional line from another context, I intend “to restore the scripto inferior, the
underlying content that has been obscured in a heavily overwritten palimpsest.” 30 While

Harry N. Scheiber, “Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History,”
California Law Review 72, no. 2 (March 1984): 219 (emphasis in the original).
29
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 9. See also Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court; and Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty.”
30
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973: The USSR’s
Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press,
2017), xviii.
28
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Lochner era historiography may not quite be heavily overwritten, a substantial number of
articles and books on the subject points to its significance in the development of
American constitutional law. If Lochner era historiography has obscured the legal-socialphilosophical nexus represented in Hudson County, this study seeks to shed some light on
the public rights scripto inferior.

Public Water Rights and the American Commercial Republic
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries public water rights
jurisprudence rested predominately on economic ground. The mercantile importance of
unhindered trade and mobility on American waterways—that is, the expansion and
promotion of the American commercial republic—fostered the development of public
rights principles through which the legal and jurisprudential preservation of public waters
advanced the general welfare of the people. Often, this was precisely because the best
economic outcome was the best outcome for the public at large. This utilitarian legal
doctrine, steeped in the principles of American republicanism and constitutional law,
characterized the progressive relationship between law and economics in the nineteenth
century—a relationship within which public water rights thrived. 31
J. Willard Hurst eloquently explained these concepts in his seminal 1956 work
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States. Hurst
sweepingly asserted that nineteenth-century American jurisprudents used law as a tool to
help “create a framework for change” through which the energies of private enterprise
could be released, thus contributing to the national accumulation of capital (of which “we
Hurst, “The Control of the Environment,” chap. 2 in Law and the Conditions. See also
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 20–38.
31
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were scarce”). 32 Hurst’s assertion has since become synonymous with a school of thought
known as legal instrumentalism. A key component of Hurst’s thesis is a differentiation
between “dynamic” and “static” property in terms of economic productive potential—that
is, “property in motion or at risk rather than property secure and at rest.” 33 Dynamic
(productive) property was to be safeguarded not out of some obscure deference to vested
rights, but in pursuit of the great common-law tenet that the welfare of the people runs
supreme. In the nineteenth-century United States there was no greater public good than
the national accumulation of capital through private enterprise and commercial
expansion.
Hurst described instrumentalism as having a “high regard for keeping open the
channels of change.” The channels of change meant many things in nineteenth-century
America, but here we must contend only with one: the American waterway. 34 The
expansion of the American commercial republic—both geographically and
economically—hinged on unbridled access to and use of these naturally occurring public
highways. The early-nineteenth-century legal scholar and prolific author of water law
treatises Joseph Angell commemorated the pivotal role of American waterways in his

Hurst, Law and the Conditions, 25. Hurst identified two “working principles” of legal
instrumentalism:
(1) The legal order should protect and promote the release of creative energy to
the greatest extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for such
expression. . . . (2) The legal order should mobilize the resources of the
community to help shape an environment which would give men more liberty by
increasing the practical range of choices open to them and minimizing the
limiting force of circumstances. (p. 6)
33
Hurst, 24.
34
Hurst, 27. Hurst’s “channels of change” refer to the ways in which nineteenth-century
jurisprudents adhered to doctrinal concepts “in favor of freedom for creative change as against
unyielding protection for existing commitments . . . to protect the community’s authority to deal
with shifting conditions affecting the functional integrity of the whole system . . . [and] to
maintain the general framework of dealings.”
32
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1857 Treatise on the Law of Highways:
To them [navigable rivers] has the public at large been extensively
indebted for the easy and convenient communication by them afforded,
between the maritime cities and the rapidly growing and productive
regions of the interior. They have imparted energy to the enterprising
genius of the people, and been the means of transforming deserts and
forests into cultivated and fruitful fields, flourishing settlements, and
opulent cities. 35
It was within this context that the preservation of public waters undergirded the
development of public rights, which paved the way for the establishment of a doctrinal
set of principles that preserved state water resources in trust for the benefit of the public.
These public trust principles established what would later become known as the public
trust doctrine. We must first, however, understand how the “publicness” of nineteenthcentury American waters drew upon a robust common-law heritage of riparian rights and
“navigability.”
Chancellor James Kent defined riparian rights in 1827 as the “right[s] of soil of
owners of land bounded by the sea, or on navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows,
[and which] extends to high water mark.” Riparian rights did not extend to the submerged
land underneath water; rather, the banks and beds below the high water mark belonged
“to the state as trustee for the public . . . and [the people] have the absolute proprietary
interest in the same.” 36 In other words, riparian rights were (and still are) property rights
incident to navigable waters. Moreover, riparian proprietors held “no property in the
water itself, but a simple usufruct [right to use without damaging or diminishing] while it

Joseph K. Angell and Thomas Durfee, A Treatise on the Law of Highways, 3rd ed., ed.
George F. Choate (Boston: Little, Brown, 1886), 43, quoted in Novak, The People’s Welfare,
131.
36
James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 13th ed., eds. O. W. Holmes, Jr. and
Charles M. Barnes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1884), 3:592.
35
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passes along.” 37
Chancellor Kent’s definition of riparian rights incorporated the English commonlaw determinant of navigability—or, “test of a river’s publicness”: Waters that moved
with the “ebbs and flows” of the tides were considered navigable. 38 The most important
development in water law during the nineteenth century was the “inland march” of public
rights on American waterways, wherein the “ebbs and flows” determinant of navigability
gave way to the broader—and more suitable to “our great rivers and inland seas”—
doctrine of navigable-in-fact in The Propeller Genesee Chief (1851). 39 Charles
Wilkinson points to the “classic definition” for navigable-in-fact waters, as given in The
Daniel Ball (1870): “[P]ublic navigable rivers . . . are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water.” 40 Thus, a “fundamental, redistributive shift” of inland
waterway rights, from private to public, occurred gradually and incongruously in a
handful of states during the first half of the nineteenth century—a shift predicated on the
conceptualization of water as a public highway for commerce. 41 Riparian rights are, of
course, subject to the common-law maxim salus populi suprema lex est (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law). That is, where public (navigable) waters bound or bisect
private property, the paramount rights of the public to commerce and navigation prevail;

Kent, Commentaries, 3:617.
Novak, The People’s Welfare, 132.
39
Blumm and Moses, “The Public Trust,” 14; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338
(1876); The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
40
Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust,” 447–448; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 563 (1870) (emphasis mine).
41
Novak, The People’s Welfare, 131–133; Blumm and Moses, “The Public Trust,” 14–
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any obstruction to navigation erected by a riparian proprietor (such as a mill dam, for
instance) might constitute a public nuisance and thus put it at odds with the public
interest. 42
Hurst built into his model the presumption that liberty meant “liberty for
individuals.” 43 For the conventional legal instrumentalist, individual liberty was both an
end in itself as well as the means through which the American commercial republic
“progressed.” 44 Yet others, such as Harry Scheiber, have refined this instrumentalist
approach to show how jurisprudents operated within “the context of a tension model that
embraces competing principles of law,” i.e., vested rights, public rights, and economic
growth. Scheiber maintains that such a methodology “can yield a more accurate historical
understanding of ‘rule’ and ‘policy’ in American legal development.” 45 It was indeed
within this context that the adjudication of water rights disputes that hinged on publicprivate distinctions during the late nineteenth century contributed to the development of
the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it is indicative of the instrumental role of the
sovereign in promoting the general welfare, what Scheiber describes as a “quest for
continuity and regularity in rules as being entirely consistent with the formulation of
positive notions of public rights.” 46
We must remember, too, that public interest doctrine had been “sufficiently
developed” by the mid-nineteenth century, well before the “startling intrusion” of
Munn. 47 In one of his many excellent contributions to the historiography of public rights
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and constitutional law in America, Scheiber dismisses the “common view” that the
decision in Munn was based on a “novel, or inexplicable, application” of an obscure
seventeenth-century legal concept. 48 Instead, Scheiber argues, “the basic concept of
‘public interest’” had been well established in American law by the mid-nineteenth
century and undergirded the development of a robust public rights tradition. 49 What
Justice Stephen Field and his colleagues did, then, was to build on this regulatory
tradition through innovative applications of public rights jurisprudence in order to
maintain an American economic order then at risk of being toppled by competing policy
demands and external forces.
It is necessary now to differentiate between public interest doctrine—which
defined Munn and the Lochner era—and the public trust doctrine upon which public
water rights prevailed. First, public interest doctrine must not be confused with what
Scheiber cogently refers to as the “affectation doctrine” that characterized the formalistic
judicial policing of the boundary between “two kinds of business enterprises—those
affected with the public interest and those not so affected.” 50 Simply put, the affectation
doctrine referred to the nature of Lochner era jurisprudence whereby the Supreme Court
strictly distinguished between a public sphere and a private sphere. Lochner era
formalists policed the boundaries of these spheres to determine what was public (and,
thereby, subject to regulation) and what was private (and off limits to regulatory
government intervention). 51 Outside of this retrospective interpretation of the Supreme
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Court from 1877 to 1934, 52 public interest doctrine may simply be understood as the
jurisprudential tendency to promote the broad interests and welfare of the public over the
rights of any individual. 53
The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, refers to the jurisprudential
commitment to secure, in trust for the people, common (or, public) property for the
common good. 54 What distinguishes the public trust doctrine is its positivist legal role
and requisite reliance on governmental authority to restrain private property when the
general welfare demands it. When private rights begin to prevent, limit, or injure the
rights of the public it is this sovereign power—the police power—that authorizes the
government to restrain or regulate private rights for the benefit of the public. 55 Thus, the
public trust doctrine inherently relies on two essential concepts: public interest and the
police power.
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Development of the public trust doctrine can be traced through a few
representative Supreme Court water rights cases in the late nineteenth century that,
incidentally, upheld both public water rights and broad commercial interests. 56 These
cases forged a doctrinal set of judicial principles that preserved state water resources in
trust for the benefit of the public. It is important to understand here that these trust
principles protected the submerged land (the common property of the people) beneath the
water and not the water itself—recall that there can be “no property in the water itself,
but a simple usufruct while it passes along.” 57
The first case to consider is Barney v. Keokuk (1876), in which the court
determined that public improvements to the bed or bank of a navigable river that obstruct
a riparian proprietor’s access to the water do not constitute a taking. 58 In Barney, a
riparian proprietor along the Mississippi River disputed the City of Keokuk’s erection of
a steamboat landing on “newly made ground below original high water.” 59 The Supreme
Court upheld the lower court ruling in favor of the city, finding that the steamboat
landing is “a public use of the river bank, which is absolutely necessary to the use of the
river as a navigable water.” 60 Furthermore, the court clarified that “the shore between
high and low water mark, as well as the bed of the river, belongs to the state.” 61 Most
importantly, the court affirmed that “public authorities ought to have entire control of the
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great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage
and convenience.” 62 Barney, then, affirmed the proprietorship of a state in the beds and
banks of its public waterways for the express purposes of “commerce and navigation.”
Moreover, Barney presents a straightforward precedent for public-private water rights
disputes. In affirming that the “proprietorship of the beds and shores of such [navigable]
waters . . . properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty,” the court paved
the way for a more assertive affirmation of public trust principles. 63
The justices in Barney asserted the paramount rights of the public to the beds and
banks of the Mississippi River for the express purpose of protecting the vast commercial
interests at stake. In Hurst’s model, this public property was dynamic and productive,
whereas the riparian claimant’s static property contributed little to the American
commercial republic. Furthermore, the justices established a firm boundary at the “high
water mark” at which they could distinguish between the paramount public interest in
commercial navigation and the subservient private rights of Barney. Barney was decided
a year before Munn v. Illinois (1877), the “foundational case for the ‘affected with a
public interest doctrine’” that marks the beginning of the Lochner era. 64 In a scathing
dissent in Munn, Justice Field decried the “clothing” of a private business with “magic”
language intended to “change a private business into a public one.” 65 Field’s dissent
ultimately set the tone for decades of substantive due process interpretation during the
Lochner era. For Justice Field, the public-private distinction was inviolable, and he
“refused to provide ‘a harbor where refuge can be found’ for the inconsistent claims of
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any particularistic interest group.” 66 This distinction can be seen in Barney, yet Field
himself proved his willingness to uphold the public side of the public-private distinction
fifteen years later.
In what would become the “central substantive thought in [twentieth-century]
public trust litigation,” Justice Field’s majority opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois (1892) firmly established the public trust doctrine as the juridical guardian of
public waterways. 67 The justices in Illinois Central confronted the question whether the
Illinois legislature’s 1869 grant of a vast tract of submerged land along Chicago’s
waterfront to the Illinois Central Railroad Corporation could be revoked without
compensation. In the original 1869 act authorizing the grant, the state legislature intended
to grant the title and interests of the submerged lands in question to the city of Chicago.
However, the final version that passed (over the governor’s veto) ceded them instead to
the railroad company; the legislature repealed the act in 1873, thus revoking the railroad’s
grant. 68 Nonetheless, Illinois Central Railroad continued to build on these since-revoked
submerged lands and the state, in 1883, sought injunctive relief through the courts. 69
The question, as Justice Field put it, was “whether the railroad corporation can
hold the lands and control the waters by the grant against any future exercise of power
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over them by the State.” 70 He strongly rejected such an absolute derogation of the state’s
power as trustee for the public:
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust
by which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time . . .
[and] the power to resume the trust whenever the State judges best is, we
think, incontrovertible. 71
Field asserted that the “control of the State for the purposes of the [public] trust can never
be lost.” 72 One such purpose of the public trust, then, was ensuring that any
conveyance—from the state to a private party, corporation, or municipality—of rights or
title in submerged lands beneath navigable waters only occur “when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters.” 73 In other
words, any state grant of rights or title in trust property must remain subservient to the
public interest and the common good.
More importantly, Justice Field integrated the two core tenets of the public trust
doctrine: public interest and the police power. Field likened an alienation of a state’s trust
obligations to the preposterous concept of a state relinquishing its police powers: “The
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.” 74 This
link between public interest, trust obligations, and the police power validated the
doctrinal integrity of “positive notions of public rights.” 75 Here again, as in Barney, a

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
72
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
73
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 387 (emphasis mine).
74
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
75
Scheiber, “Public Rights,” 219 (emphasis in the original).
70
71

20

Supreme Court decision significantly expanded the scope and intent of public trust
principles in support of the common ideological tenet of securing the American
commercial republic. Yet Illinois Central relied heavily on an 1856 Iowa state court
decision of “signal importance” to public water rights jurisprudence. 76
Scheiber asserts that “the Iowa court unequivocally asserted the public interest in
a mighty river [the Mississippi] that ran its course through half the length of a continent,
carrying the commerce of the American heartland.” 77 Glaringly obvious in this statement
is the underlying economic dimension in which the American public held a paramount
interest. Where Justice Field declared in 1892 that submerged lands were held “in trust
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing,” 78 Iowa Justice William Woodward
wrote some thirty-six years previously that the submerged lands and waters of the
Mississippi River belonged to the sovereign “as a trust for the public use and benefit.” 79
Justice Field is often cast as a champion of legal conservatism and laissez-faire
constitutionalism, but this betrays his important contributions to the development of the
public trust doctrine. 80 As we have seen, Justice Field concurred in Barney and later
authored the majority opinion in Illinois Central, two of the most important doctrinal
cases in public trust jurisprudence. And, as Scheiber again reminds us, it was “Justice
Field, the high priest of judicial conservatism and vested property rights, and former

Scheiber, “The Road to Munn,” 348.
Scheiber, 348.
78
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
79
McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 29 (1856), quoted in Scheiber, “The Road to
Munn,” 347.
80
Paul Kens, Justice Stephen Field: Shaping Liberty from the Gold Rush to the Gilded
Age (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 6; and Bernard Schwartz, A History of the
Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 174–175.
76
77

21

California judge, who wrote the decision upholding public policy and state discretion.” 81
Thus, similar to the obfuscation of public rights and public trust doctrine during the
Lochner era, to accept disparagingly reductionist accounts of Justice Field’s
jurisprudence obscures the true nature and significance of his contributions to American
constitutional law.
Charles McCurdy and Harry Scheiber have pointed to the significance of Justice
Field’s “energetic” and “innovative” public rights jurisprudence in mid-nineteenthcentury California—and later on the US Supreme Court—in contributing to the
development of the public trust doctrine. 82 Contrary to prevailing (and misguided)
accounts, Justice Field did not act simply as the judicial steward of big business and
inviolable constitutional guarantees of economic liberty. Rather, Field’s Jacksonian
conception of law, liberty, public economy, and commercial republicanism undergirded
his efforts to secure, in the public interests of general economic growth, a thriving private
sphere in which unwarranted government regulation ought not interfere. As McCurdy
explains, Field “believed that public and private institutions had diametrically opposed
reasons for existence; legislation that vested public property in private corporations
would invariably lead to situations in which the people would be subject to private
greed.” 83 Field thus sought to “proscribe virtually every form of special privilege. The
result would be a harmonious system in which the public and private sectors pursued
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appropriate goals within proper spheres of action.” As far as Justice Field was concerned,
private corporations could not and should not be “affected” with a public interest.
So, in contravention to the general confines of Lochner era public-sphere
diminution, public rights in water underwent a doctrinal expansion through the
development and innovative judicial application of public trust principles. By the turn of
the century, a full-fledged public trust doctrine had been established—primarily through
instrumentalist processes that contributed to the expansion of the American commercial
republic. Before we proceed further, I must draw once more upon the preeminent
authority on public trust doctrine, Joseph Sax, who characterized the doctrine in two
important ways. First, drawing together basic principles from the classic case of
Commonwealth v. Alger (1851) as well as the much later case State v. Cleveland and
Pittsburgh Railway (1916), he articulated the following tenet:
No grant may be made to a private party if that grant is of such amplitude
that the state will effectively have given up its authority to govern, but a
grant is not illegal solely because it diminishes in some degree the
quantum of traditional public uses. 84
And, more specific to the role of positive governance with regard to state police powers:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties. 85
Thus, when the New Jersey-based Hudson County Water Company contracted in 1905 to
provide water from an inland diversion of New Jersey’s Passaic River to a New York
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City borough, both state and federal courts looked “with considerable skepticism” upon
the proposed reallocation of New Jersey state waters. 86

Transcending the Economic Dimension: Water as a Natural Resource
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908), the US Supreme Court invoked
public trust principles to affirm the right of a state (New Jersey) “to protect the
atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or
dissent of the private owners of the land.” 87 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
“enlightened apostle of judicial self-restraint,” asserted in the majority opinion that state
waters were “natural advantages” to be protected and maintained “substantially
undiminished.” 88 Justice Holmes’s opinion was characteristically forthright and concise,
and is indicative of his fully matured “philosophical views on sovereignty in a republic,
as well as his jurisprudential views on the scope of judicial review . . . [and] legislative
supremacy in the American constitutional republic.” 89 Consider as well Holmes’s unique
intellectual ability to synthesize and refine social, philosophical, and legal ideas into
succinct and universally applicable judicial opinions. 90 Among his many other
contributions to the United States, Hudson County reveals the creative and innovative
synthesis of progressive legal philosophy, environmental conservationism, and public
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trust jurisprudence.
More importantly, and breaking with the economic instrumentalism inherent in
previous public water rights cases, Hudson County reconceptualized the state’s public
trust obligations to the protection of water as a natural resource in and of itself. Justice
Holmes, the preeminent progressive jurist and legal realist, characteristically cut through
the formalistic claims on which the Hudson County Water Company sought relief and
found the issue to be a question of a state’s right to maintain its natural water resources—
decoupled from any economic presupposition—for the common good. In weighing this
question Holmes resorted to well-established and validated public trust principles.
However, recall that the public trust doctrine at the turn of the century protected
submerged lands beneath the water as public property in trust for the people—it did not
protect the water itself. Furthermore, the public trust doctrine developed within a
decidedly economic instrumentalist framework and, consequently, economic interests
undergirded the legal principles through which the doctrine could be applied.
Thus, Holmes faced a quandary: Decide the case upon the well-established, yet
economically imbued, public trust doctrine; or, transcend the economic dimension
altogether and reconceptualize the rights of the public to preserve the state’s natural water
resources. Holmes could have cited even just a few prominent public trust case
precedents—Illinois Central, Barney, or Shively v. Bowlby, 91 for instance—to affirm the
right of New Jersey to restrain the Hudson County Water Company from artificially
transporting Passaic River waters outside of the state. Such an interpretation would itself
have been a novel expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond its standard proprietary
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interest in the land beneath the Passaic River and into the realm of protecting the water
itself. However, invocation of the public trust doctrine in this manner would carry with it
the affirmation that “[w]ater when reduced to possession is a commodity, which may be
sold, like any other.” 92 Holmes would then have to contend both with the constitutional
issue of interstate commerce and the formalistic tendencies of his colleagues toward
substantive readings of the Due Process Clause. 93 As we shall see, however, Holmes
indeed relied on public trust principles but cited instead Geer v. Connecticut (1896),
seemingly placing authority for his Hudson County opinion upon the tenuous concept of
public ownership. 94
We shall return to the public ownership theory in more detail momentarily; first,
we must examine the case itself and the ways in which Justice Holmes interpreted it on
behalf of the majority court. The Hudson County case hinged on a June 1905 New Jersey
state injunction against the Hudson County Water Company seeking to prevent the
diversion and sale “without limitation as to quantity” of Passaic River waters from an
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upstream facility in Little Falls, New Jersey, to customers in Staten Island, New York. 95
At the time, fresh water on Staten Island was sourced from seven wells throughout the
island, which a sub-committee report to the New York City Board of Estimate and
Apportionment asserted “are clearly incapable of supplying enough water for the whole
island” and “will not permanently supply the needs of the growing population.” 96
Following the 1898 consolidation of Greater New York and subsequent establishment in
1905 of the State Water Supply Commission, efforts began on construction of a city-wide
municipal water supply system linking the boroughs to the upstate Croton and Catskill
mountain aqueduct systems. 97 However, these projects would take years to complete and
the contract with Hudson County Water was a temporary measure intended to provide
“immediate relief” to the strained water supply system on Staten Island. 98
New Jersey, facing its own water supply crisis, determined not to go along with
this plan. The New York Times reported that New Jersey state officials “became exercised
over the proposition of the East Jersey Company to furnish water to any borough of New
York City, seeming to fear that the city has designs on all of the watersheds of the
adjoining State.” 99 This account seems well attenuated to the political circumstances at
the time, especially considering the long-standing animosity between the two states over
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waterway rights as well as the jurisdiction of Staten Island itself. 100 The injunction
brought by New Jersey Attorney General Robert McCarter carried with it the authority of
the state’s 1905 Batcheller Act, which made it “unlawful for any person or corporation to
transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh
water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this state [New Jersey] into any other
state, for use therein.” Legislative officials in New Jersey thus sought, in the face of rapid
urbanization and growing demand for fresh water on both sides of the state boundary, to
“preserve and maintain” the waters of New Jersey for the “health and prosperity of all
citizens of this state.” 101
In the first state case, McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co. (N.J. 1905)
(hereinafter McCarter I), Vice Chancellor James Bergen affirmed the state’s assertion of
its inherent right to preserve its natural supply of water despite the fact “that the present
available supply of water in the Passaic river is largely in excess of the present
consumption by New Jersey inhabitants, as now supplied.” 102 Bergen asserted, in clear
and efficient prose, that the state’s justification of perceived future demand outweighed
the Hudson County Water Company’s claims to present excesses of supply. 103 More
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importantly, Bergen expanded the application of public trust principles beyond
conventional proprietary interests in submerged lands by reasoning that “the state in its
sovereign right, as owner of the bed of all tidal streams, becomes the owner of all fresh
water flowing upon its land.” 104 And the state, furthermore, “being the last riparian
owner[,] . . . should be considered as the ultimate owner of such unused common
property, to be held in trust for the use of all its subjects.” The “unused common
property” Bergen referred to was the running water that remained after it had “already
served the proper purposes of [upstream] private riparian owners.” 105
The concept of public ownership—that is, state ownership of public waters (as
“common property”)—that Bergen asserted in McCarter I seems remarkably similar to
the public trust doctrine, which I described above as the jurisprudential commitment to
secure, in trust for the people, public property for the common good. Yet the public trust
doctrine at the time pertained strictly to the title of submerged lands beneath navigable
waters—not the water itself—and the question in McCarter I (as it did in later iterations)
dealt squarely with the water itself. Vice Chancellor Bergen took the view that the

The constant increase in our population, considered in connection with the
unchanging extent of our watershed and the consequent limit of the natural
supply of water necessary for domestic and healthful purposes, may justly alarm
the state with regard to the future . . . and justifies the restriction of the
appropriation of its property. It is admitted that the Passaic river is the most
important of the available sources of water supply for the people of New Jersey,
and that their necessity, therefore, is constantly increasing.
104
McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 535.
105
McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 531–533. Bergen declared:
Thus it appears from immemorial times running water . . . has been esteemed
common property, subject to usufructuary use by the owners of land over which
it passed . . . If diverted, it must be returned undiminished, except as to the
incidental waste made necessary by the personal private use, for domestic and
other recognized lawful purposes.”
Recall as well that riparian proprietors held “no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct
[right to use without damaging or diminishing] while it passes along.” (see note 36 above)
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Hudson County Water Company’s purported right to divert water from the Passaic River
“without limitation as to quantity” could “only be sustained upon the ground of
ownership.” 106 Thus Bergen relied on common-law authorities as well as an earlier New
Jersey water rights case to assert that the water company held absolutely no such
“exclusive ownership in running water,” whereas the state, as “ultimate owner,” could
freely restrain any interference, diversion, or abstraction of its water. 107
In McCarter II (N.J. 1906), the superior New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s findings against private ownership and rights of diversion. 108
McCarter II seemed to reaffirm the significance of state trusteeship with regard to public
waters: Vice Chancellor Bergen’s “unused common property . . . held in trust for the use
of all its subjects” became, in McCarter II, a “residuum of common or public ownership
that under our system rests in the state as a trustee for all the people.” 109 However the
superior court, citing Geer v. Connecticut, distinguished the concept of public ownership
as an absolute, sovereign “right of control.” 110 This interpretation grossly misconstrued
Geer and the concept of public ownership, imbuing the state with ultimate authority
“subject to no constraints, not even to constitutional restrictions.” 111 Not surprisingly,
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original).
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Geer and the public ownership theory were later “progressively cut back until Geer itself
was overruled in 1979.” 112
While the state may be said to hold common property in trust (as the justices in
both McCarter I and II did), the underlying presumption was that the state, as “ultimate
owner,” could regulate such common property solely through its authority as the
sovereign owner. In other words, such regulation need not be premised on that cardinal
concept of public interest—sovereign ownership carried with it an absolute and
unconditional right of control. The patent absurdity of such a doctrine did not go
unnoticed; the Supreme Court itself repeatedly derided the “whole ownership theory” in
subsequent wildlife management cases, characterizing it as “a weak prop,” “pure
fantasy,” and “legal fiction.” 113 More importantly, the court’s assertion in Toomer v.
Witsell (1948) highlights the fallacy of public ownership theory as “but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people [that is, the paramount
public interest] that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource.” 114
Here, then, is the distinction between public ownership—with its faulty
presumption of absolute and unconditional right of control—and public trust, which is

dual federalism never materialized; Geer and the public ownership theory were “progressively cut
back until Geer itself was overruled in 1979.” (p. 314)
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undergirded by the core tenets of public interest and state police power. The state indeed
retains a “right of control” with the public trust doctrine, but control resides in the police
power of the state—not as proprietor but as trustee for the public—to be exercised only in
pursuit of a valid public interest. Ownership theory amounts to a tacit recognition that the
state may regulate common property or restrain private or qualified rights in public
property freely and solely on the basis that it is the absolute, or “ultimate,” owner—
without a concomitantly sufficient public interest justification. Thus, when the case came
before the US Supreme Court in 1908, Justice Holmes must have understood this
fallibility of the public ownership theory and steered clear of invoking it.
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, Justice Holmes asserted that his
decision rested “upon broader ground than that which was emphasized below, since in
our opinion it is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the State
may be said to possess.” 115 Broader ground it was indeed, for Holmes imbued his opinion
with public trust principles while simultaneously separating it from the economic
instrumentalist framework within which the public trust doctrine typically operated. To
accomplish this, Holmes cited Geer v. Connecticut to uphold the state court’s finding that
the illegally diverted waters of the Passaic River could not enter into interstate
commerce. 116 Even further, he borrowed from Vice Chancellor Bergen the expansion of
public trust principles beyond the standard beds-and-banks application, yet he refused to
subscribe to anything resembling the ownership theory. Instead, Justice Holmes recast the

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 354–355 (1908).
Just as the wild birds in Geer could never enter into commerce without the consent of
the state, so too did the New Jersey Court of Errors determine that the waters of the Passaic River,
“abstracted” without the consent of the state—the “ultimate owner”—“cannot legitimately enter
into interstate commerce.” McCarter II, 70 N.J. Eq. at 719 (see note 109 above).
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public trust doctrine into a more universal proposition of public rights in which water
existed as a natural resource in and of itself.
Justice Holmes’s reliance on Geer is both remarkably deceptive and strikingly
simple. Holmes cited Geer not to invoke the potentially troublesome ownership theory,
but rather to invoke the public trust doctrine. Holmes’s first citation to Geer appears at
the end of the following passage:
[T]he State, as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the
public . . . may protect by suit in this court from interference in the name
of property outside of the State’s jurisdiction, [and] one would think that it
could protect by statute from interference in the same name within. On
this principle of public interest and the police power, and not merely as the
inheritor of a royal prerogative, the State may make laws for the
preservation of game, which seems a stronger case. Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 534. 117
Here, Justice Holmes at once props up the principles of the public trust (“On this
principle of public interest and the police power . . .”), evades the public ownership
theory (“. . . and not merely as the inheritor of a royal prerogative . . .” [from which the
“residuum of public ownership” conveys]), and then affirms both Geer and Hudson
County on the basis of the public trust doctrine (“. . . the State may make laws for the
preservation of game, which seems a stronger case.”). In fact, Holmes’s citation to Geer
points specifically to the concluding section of Justice White’s Geer opinion in which he
turns from ownership concepts to public interest and police power, asserting “the
undoubted existence in the State of a police power . . . [which] flows from the duty of the
State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply.” 118 This indisputable state police
power, Justice Holmes declared, superseded any claims of deprivation of property
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355–356 (1908) (citing Kansas
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 [1902], and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 [1907]).
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without due process, and so “[t]he defense under the Fourteenth Amendment is disposed
of by what we have said.” 119
Justice Holmes further dispensed with the Hudson County Water Company’s
remaining claims rather curtly. Of the supposed impairment of the obligation of
contracts: “One whose rights . . . are subject to state restriction cannot remove them from
the power of the State by making a contract about them.” Citing Geer one more time to
deny any interference with interstate commerce: “A man cannot acquire a right to
property by his desire to use it in commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his
otherwise limited and qualified right to the same end.” And, lastly, of the supposed denial
of equal privileges: “Within the boundary [of New Jersey], citizens of New York are as
free to purchase as citizens of New Jersey.” 120
Thus, Holmes applied public trust principles to Hudson County without ever
explicitly doing so. He refused to ground his opinion on an economic presupposition in
which New Jersey water functioned either as a highway for commerce, as a source of
power or production, or as an article of commerce. Rather, he relied on simple, selfevident assertions to establish his “broader ground”:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. 121
And, more plainly:
The legal conception of the necessary [potential use cases of water] is apt
to be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are benefits
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from a great river that might escape a lawyer's view. . . . [The state] finds
itself in possession of what all admit to be a great public good. 122
Holmes further declared that a state need not specify how, why, or to what end it might
seek to preserve its natural resources: “[W]hat it has it may keep and give no one a reason
for its will.” 123 Hudson County thus underscores the inherent and indisputable public
interest duty of a state, as “guardian of the public welfare,” to protect and maintain public
waters, no matter to what end. 124 It becomes clear, then, that public waters of the state—
lacking any real or supposed economic purpose or private interest—ought to be
considered a natural resource.
The question remains, then, as to why Holmes’s majority colleagues—except lone
dissenter Justice McKenna, who did not pen a dissenting opinion—concurred with his
decision. The most likely answer stems from the fact that the water company’s contract
“was illegal when it was made,” thus abrogating any grounds for a formalist “liberty of
contract” interpretation; Holmes’s colleagues had no choice but to concur in favor of
public rights. 125 The implicit recognition of water as a natural resource may be seen as
especially novel given that the term natural resource is itself ambiguous and somewhat
anachronistic in a legal sense. Holmes may not have felt inclined to use the term because
it did not officially exist in legal lexicon. For instance, the first edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary (1891) does not define either natural resource or public resource. 126 The
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357.
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conspicuously naturalist context:
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superior state court judgment he affirmed, however, freely used the term in its
contemporary conservationist context:
The act of 1905 [prohibiting the transportation of water outside the state of
New Jersey] looks not only to the present, but to the future. It recognizes
that the growth and prosperity of the state depend not alone upon the
advantages that it presently affords, but upon the assurance that the like
advantages, to the extent of our natural resources, properly conserved, will
remain for posterity. This policy of foresight, and the desire to foreclose
in advance any claim of a vested right to transport the waters of our lakes
and streams beyond the borders of the state, doubtless entered into the
motive of the legislature in imposing a present prohibition.” 127
Holmes may also have avoided the term, moreover, because of the economic
pretext associated with it. As with the economic instrumentalist component of latenineteenth-century American law, environmental conservationism was steeped in
American capitalist and republican ideology—to many Americans, conservation meant
the preservation of forests, rivers, and soil for continued economic exploitation, but
through more responsible and sustainable programs. 128 Later editions of Black’s Law
Dictionary—even as late as the ninth edition in 2009—presume this economic basis,
defining natural resource as “[a]ny material from nature having potential economic value
or providing for the sustenance of life, such as timber, minerals, oil, water, and
wildlife.” 129 Holmes thus used plain terms such as “natural advantages” and “great public

who likes, it is said to be “publici juris;” as in the case of light, air, and public
water. Or it designates things which are owned by ‘the public;’ that is, the entire
state or community, and not by any private person.” (p. 965; emphasis in the
original)
The second edition (1910) defines water-course as a “natural stream of water fed from permanent
or periodically natural sources.” (p. 1223)
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good” to imbue his opinion—and the constitutional status of water rights—with public
trust principles and the progressive, non-exploitative ideals of environmental
conservation. 130

Realism and Environmental Conservation: The Holmes-Roosevelt Nexus
How, then, can we explain Holmes’s Hudson County opinion and its significance?
It is difficult to assess Holmes’s reasoning outside of the reported Supreme Court
opinion. Despite being a prolific writer and expositor in both public and private
correspondence throughout his lifetime, Holmes hardly ever mentioned the Hudson
County case. 131 Nor has Holmes’s judicial legacy ever been assessed within the context
of environmental conservationism, one of the great philosophical and political
movements of the early twentieth century.
We have seen how easy it was for Holmes to undercut his formalistic colleagues
by disqualifying the case for consideration on a “liberty of contract” premise. Relying on
public trust principles to affirm New Jersey’s right to regulate its natural water resources
would have been difficult without reckoning as well with the constitutional issue of
interstate commerce. In order to avoid this problem, as we have seen, Holmes
reconceptualized public trust principles while simultaneously separating them from the
economic instrumentalist framework within which the public trust doctrine typically

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356, 357 (1908).
Notwithstanding the May 30, 1908, letter to Nina Gray (see note 132 below),
Holmes’s only reference to Hudson County appears in a letter to John Henry Wigmore—in
response to a query for some of Holmes’s published court opinions—in which Holmes cites
Hudson County as a case on “rights of State v. State etc.” Holmes to Wigmore, December 4,
1910, General Correspondence, Mark Dewolfe Howe Research Materials, Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. Digital Suite, Harvard Law School Library.
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operated. Yet this does not answer the question of how or why water needed to be
“reconceptualized.” If Holmes imbued his opinion with the progressive, non-exploitative
ideals of environmental conservation, how did he do so? In considering Hudson County
as a question of a state’s right to maintain its natural water resources for the perpetual
common good, Holmes must have shifted perspectives, looking not to “a study of [law]
as an anthropological document from the outside,” but rather to the “establishment of
[legal] postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires.” 132 To find these
contemporary social and political imperatives, we need look no further than May 1908,
little more than a month after the Hudson County decision.
One of Holmes’s few written references—an indirect reference, no less—to his
Hudson County opinion appears in a May 30, 1908, letter to Nina Gray. Holmes wrote of
a White House dinner reception he attended on May 12, the night prior to a “meeting of
the Governors,” and that “[t]he next day in his opening address the Presd’t . . . [illegible]
. . . with a quotation from an opinion of mine.” 133 The opinion, of course, was Hudson

Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Law in Science and Science in Law,” in Collected Legal
Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 225–226.
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Holmes to Nina Gray, May 30, 1908, John G. Palfrey Collection of Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Digital Suite, Harvard Law School Library. In the
letter, Holmes seems amenable to Roosevelt’s Hudson County comments, but several illegible
sections preclude a thorough transcription of his words:
. . . a quotation from an opinion of mine which a little before the . . . [illegible] . . .
of an attack. Which squared things. That night I went to a private dinner . . . and
had a very nice talk with the Presdt (in which coincidentally we said our last
words about the old No. Securities Case & that matter is finished).” (see note 142
below)
The illegible portions of Holmes’s letter are characteristic of his awful handwritten prose, as
described in one-time Holmes law clerk Chauncey Belknap’s October 8, 1915, diary entry:
I chuckled when he [Holmes] complimented my handwriting. Dean Thayer
[Harvard Dean of Law] is the only other person who has been equally generous,
and these two have the worst hands ever man attempted to decipher. The justice
tells the story on himself of Chief Justice Field, of Mass., who exclaimed in
despair, “Holmes, you are indictable as a fraud at common law, because your
handwriting looks legible but isn’t.” (Todd C. Peppers, et al., “Clerking for
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County, which Roosevelt lauded in his opening address to the 1908 Conference of the
Governors on natural resource management and environmental conservation as the “root
of the idea of conservation of our resources in the interests of our people.” 134 Here, at the
Conference of the Governors, we find the social and political imperatives that
undergirded the “accurately measured social desires” upon which Holmes must have
leaned.
The 1908 Conference of the Governors may rightly be understood as “the
beginning of a true national conservation movement.” 135 Paul Russell Cutright wrote in
1985 that
the results of the conference were immediate and far reaching[,] . . . [and]
gave the conservation movement a prestige and momentum previously
unknown and raised it to a plane that enabled it to survive the various
reversals it later suffered as a consequence of periodic shifts in the
political climate. 136
A contemporary reporter wrote favorably of the conference in Harper’s Weekly:
It is very rare for so much to be said that was worth hearing, recalling,
thinking about, and acting upon as was said at the conference of
Governors. The great value of the conference was educational. To teach
the people to appreciate, develop, and conserve the wealth of the nation is
a duty of enormous importance, and none too soon undertaken. 137
Still, such accounts of the conference and of the conservation movement at large
recognize only Roosevelt’s energetic executive administration in “formulating,
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implementing, and executing his wide-ranging conservation program.” 138 Characteristic
of these hagiographic accounts are references to executive actions, the creation of
administrative agencies, and Roosevelt’s many impassioned speeches on conservation. 139
Absent from these accounts is the instrumental role of the American judiciary in applying
innovative judicial doctrine to uphold the rights of the public to natural resources—water
chief among them.
Recall, for a moment, Teddy Roosevelt’s claim that America’s “public resources
were being handled and disposed of in accordance with the small considerations of petty
legal formalities, instead of for the large purposes of constructive development.” 140 We
now know, thanks to the outstanding historical work of legal historians, that Roosevelt’s
characterization misrepresents the legal order of the Progressive Era. Consider as well the
oft-overlooked fact that seven Supreme Court justices attended the 1908 Conference of
the Governors—a decidedly meaningful and symbolic representation of the federal
judiciary at a first-of-its-kind conservation conference. Nowhere else might the earlytwentieth-century confluence of jurisprudential progressiveness and environmental
conservationism be more apparent.
We should be careful, however, to malign the former president, whose
recollection is perhaps an accurate representation of the social context in which the
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Figure 1. Conference attendees assembled at the North Portico of the White House, May
13, 1908. President Roosevelt is seated, front row, in the center of the group (seventh
from the left); Vice President Fairbanks is to his left, followed in order of seniority by
Supreme Court Justices Harlan, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, and Moody.
Reproduced from Harper’s Weekly, May 30, 1908, 13. 141
contemporary American judiciary was perceived in less-than-ideal terms. But if we dig a
little deeper, we find a former president unwilling to concede, in 1913 at least, that the
American judiciary virtually created the public trust doctrine. Here, too, Roosevelt
misrepresents the facts. Roosevelt claimed that Herbert Knox Smith (of the Inland
Waterways Commission and National Conservation Commission) “helped to develop and
drive into the public conscience the idea that the people ought to retain title to our natural
resources and handle them by the leasing system.” 142 As we have seen, the “idea” that the
people ought to retain title to natural resources was already firmly established judicial
doctrine by the end of the nineteenth century. And, just five years previously, Roosevelt
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commended the “learned justice” at the opening address of this Conference of the
Governors on a Supreme Court case that rested firmly on public trust principles. 143
Taken together, Hudson County and the Conference of the Governors mark the
confluence of an as-yet-undeveloped undercurrent of realist judicial doctrine with the
social and cultural currents that undergirded Progressive Era environmental
conservationism. Just as Holmes’s opinion at once repudiated the constitutional excesses
of Lochner era legal formalism and reconceptualized the legal status of water, so too did
environmental conservationism repudiate the nineteenth-century notion that natural
resources were inexhaustible and predestined for reckless human exploitation. 144 Holmes,
on a personal level, understood this basic tenet of conservation philosophy:
Civilization is the reduction of the infinite to the finite. The realizing that
there is so much forest, coal, etc. so much even atmosphere—and no more.
I wonder if it might not be possible that those who are withdrawing
nitrogen from the latter might in time be found to be doing a deadly
thing. 145
Indeed, Holmes was as much a philosopher as he was a jurist, and his ability to
encapsulate deep-seated philosophical and legal ideas into neat, succinct judicial opinions
contributed to his celebrity and modern image as a great American jurist. His greatest
Conference of the Governors, 12. This should be considered as well in the context of
the fraught relationship between the President and his Supreme Court appointee. Roosevelt
appointed Holmes to the Supreme Court because he believed Holmes to be a party-loyal
Republican who might be relied upon for Roosevelt’s own ambitions in the executive branch. But
Holmes was no tool of the President; Holmes’s dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States
(1904) clearly departed from Roosevelt’s trust-busting interests. Roosevelt thereafter harbored
deep-seated animosity toward his “spineless” judge. Holmes later wrote that he had “no doubt
that later he [Roosevelt] heartily repented over his choice when I didn’t do what he wanted in the
Northern Securities Case.” Holmes to Lewis Einstein, April 1, 1928, General Correspondence,
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intellectual ability may have been his faculty for refining and synthesizing disparate ideas
into singularly conspicuous judicial declarations, in a way that biographer Richard Posner
likened to Shakespeare, “though on a much smaller scale. . . . He enriched where he
borrowed; his creative imitation was a species of greatness[,] . . . [and] he helped to make
American thought cosmopolitan and (paradoxically) to liberate American jurisprudential
thought from slavish adherence to English models.” 146
Hudson County also shows Holmes’s distinctly versatile nature as the
quintessential American soldier-scholar-statesman, the Yankee from Olympus. 147
Holmes, the jurist, was a common-law jurisprudent, ethical skeptic, and law-as-power
tautologist. 148 But Holmes, above all, was a philosophic realist and preeminent modernist
legal scholar. Biographer G. Edward White formed a remarkably comprehensive
characterization of Holmes by compiling recurring descriptors from contemporary
reviews of Holmes’s legal treatise The Common Law, noting that “‘science,’
‘philosophy,’ ‘history,’ and an ‘analytic’ orientation, and ‘progress’ were mutually selfreinforcing concepts. Holmes could serve as a historian, a scientist, and a progressively
oriented jurist at the same time.” 149 These qualities manifested in Oliver Wendell Holmes
as the prototypical jurisprudential realist who was occasionally inclined to move with the
currents of positive social action. Thus, among his many other contributions to the United
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States is Holmes’s “creative” synthesis of nineteenth-century progressive philosophy and
public trust doctrine in Hudson County—he borrowed, he enriched, and he reaffirmed the
sanctity of the maxim salus populi suprema lex est.
And Holmes, in 1908, must have sensed the forward momentum of environmental
conservationism; he may even have been informed by it. And he must have known that
the romanticist language he used in his Hudson County opinion would appeal directly to
conservationists. Hudson County represents, then, the remarkably fortuitous confluence
of judicial doctrine, environmental conservationism, and the beginning of a progressive
shift in American constitutional jurisprudence.

Conclusion
Donald Pisani noted in 1987 that “Frederick Haynes Newell, first director of the
United States Reclamation Service (now Bureau), prophesied in 1902 that ‘there must
come a time when water must be apportioned with justice to all, and a century or more
hence we will have it distributed not upon priority rights, but upon technical rights. . . .
Water must ultimately be conserved in the most just manner for the general welfare of all
citizens.’” Pisani continued: “That time did not come. The pursuit of wealth took
precedence. Enterprise triumphed over equity.” 150 Revealing an all-too-common
tendency in legal historiography, Pisani fails to account for the significance of Hudson
County as a progressive antecedent of legal realism and the much later formulation of
modern environmental law. Equity and public rights, it seems, did not retreat in the
Progressive Era.
Donald J. Pisani, “Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in the
Nineteenth Century,” Western Historical Quarterly 18, no. 1 (January 1987): 37.
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Holmes was no environmental activist, and his personal views were decidedly
more libertarian than his early court opinions might indicate. Much as Lochner era
jurisprudence suggests the “progressiveness” of the Supreme Court at the beginning of
the twentieth century—quite at odds with earlier interpretations of an activist court, à la
the “persistent neo-Holmesian conceptualization of the Lochner era”—Hudson County
reveals how the Court’s progressive ideology both drew from and influenced
environmental conservation philosophy. 151 In this sense, Hudson County may be best
understood as a paradigmatic signpost on the road to the “settlement of 1937” and the era
of legal realism. 152 Ultimately, as Cushman explains, “in a series of responses prompted
both by external pressures and the internal dynamics produced by this interdependence
[of constitutional doctrines], this integrated body of [Lochner era] jurisprudence eroded
and ultimately collapsed.” 153
And while judicial panels contended with a range of “complexity and tension”
from a “welter of doctrine, ideology, interest group and geographic conflict, and claims
of ‘consensus’ and ‘public interest’ . . . [as well as] ‘public rights’ theory in the light of
political realities,” the adjudication and transformation of the public trust doctrine
facilitated the refinement and enhanced the significance of public rights jurisprudence in
American law. 154 Where Lochner era jurisprudence generally diminished the scope of
public interest and seemingly prioritized vested rights, “positive notions of public rights”
experienced a correspondingly progressive expansion and affirmation. 155
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If Hudson County was ahead of its time with its reconceptualization of water
strictly as a natural resource, it legitimated the late-twentieth-century development of an
“emerging holistic paradigm” in environmental law and the expansion of the public trust
doctrine “beyond the confines of navigable waters.” 156 And, to borrow quote once more
Teddy Roosevelt: “All this is simply good common sense. The underlying principle of
conservation has been described as the application of common sense to common
problems for the common good.” 157
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